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Abstract
In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline
and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negoti-
ated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and
a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper
brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching mar-
kets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry,
coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive
equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address
issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian
marriage market.
Keywords: Matching; Dowry auction mechanism; Equilibrium stable
outcome; Competitive equilibrium outcome; Population increase; Strategy-
proof; Comparative statics.
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1 Introduction
With economic development and social modernization, the social practice of
paying dowry tends to decline in most societies. In contrast, it has been observed
in India that, in spite of economic development, a system of marriages negotiated
between families has not only continued to exist, but has in many regions of
India been accompanied by an increasing demand for dowry payments by men
(and their families). In this country, the dowry is an income transfer from the
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bride to the groom; this dowry includes resources paid by the bride’s family
to the groom’s family at the time of the wedding. The dowry may be paid
in cash or kind directly paid from a bride’s family to a groom’s family (for
instance, gifts such that motorcycles, refrigerators, cars, etc...). The factors
such as the personal qualities, the professional occupation, the incomes and the
family status contribute to determining the ”groom price” for the marriage.
Gale and Shapley (1962) initiate the marriage model. In Gale and Shapley’s
model, the stable marriage problem, money does not play a role; there are sets of
men and women of the same size. Every man has a strict preference order over
women and each woman has a strict preference order over the men. A matching
is a set of disjoint men-women pairs. A matching is stable if it is individually
rational (no person prefers to remain single rather than be matched to a partner)
and if no man and no woman prefer each other to their current partners.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduce money into the stable marriage prob-
lem and initiate the assignment games. The assignment games are the models
in which each player or agent can form one partnership at most with an interest
for each agent b on one side to form a profitable coalition with an agent g of
the opposite side. In other words, the aim of the agents is to get as much profit
as possible from their partnership. The profit obtained by each mixed-pair can
be represented in an assignment matrix. Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that
the core1 of an assignment game is the set of dual optimal solutions to the as-
signment optimization problem on the underlying matrix of mixed-pair profits;
the core and the set of stable outcomes are the same; the core is non-empty and
has a complete lattice structure2.
Becker (1981) presents a marriage model in which men and women both
possess different qualities (or potential incomes). The marriage is viewed as
a joint venture that offers greater efficiency in production (household, market,
or both). Each agent in the market chooses the partner who maximizes their
utility.
Eriksson and Karlander (2000) present the RiFle assignment game, which
is a generalization of two standard models of the theory of two-sided matching:
the marriage model of Gale and Shapley and the assignment game of Shapley
and Shubik. In the RiFle assignment game, some agents are ”rigid” and others
are ”flexible”. Rigid agents such as those found in the marriage model do not
negotiate payments, while flexible agents, found in the assignment model, do.
The Economic theories of dowry are recent and mainly describe the forma-
tion and determinants of dowry. In this literature, the dowry is investigated
in the context of the marriage market (see Rao, 1993; Zhang and Chan, 1998;
Anderson, 2003, 2007...).
The basic analytical framework adopted by the dowry theories refers to
Becker’s marriage analysis. The theoretical analysis of the dowry is thus an
1In other words, the core of the game is defined as the set of undominated outcomes. An
outcome z is dominated by another outcome y if there exists a coalition S of agents such that
every member of S prefers y to z and the rules of the game allow them to enforce y over z.
2A lattice is a partially ordered set any two of whose elements have a supremum and an
infimum. A lattice is complete when each of its subsets has a supremum and an infimum.
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extension of the theoretical analysis of the marriage market. The dowry appears
as a function of implicit price depending on the characteristics of the partners
and their rational families participating in the marriage market (Rao, 1993).
However, in the India marriage market, although the value of dowry is linked
to the quality of the groom; the dowry is a monetary payment that will be the
object of negotiations3 before the wedding. So, the dowry is one of selection
factors which determine both the preferences of grooms over brides and the
wedding between grooms and brides.
In the Indian marriage market, the agents behave as if they were: in the
marriage market of Gale and Shapley when they determine their lists of prefer-
ences; and in the assignment game when they negotiate their dowries. However,
there are neither completely rigid as in the marriage market nor completely
flexible as in assignment game.
In this market, many factors determine the preferences of grooms over brides,
as well as preferences of brides over grooms as in the marriage model of Gale
and Shapley. For instance, a groom l is ranked higher than a groom k in the list
of preferences of the bride x : if (for example) his physical appearance, Socio-
Economic status, professional occupation is better than that of k. Similarly, a
bride x is ranked higher than a bride y in the list of preferences of the groom l :
if her physical appearance, Socio-Economic status, desirable age to match are
better than those of y and if x proposes a higher dowry than y.
In the marriage model of Gale and Shapley, if x and y propose to l, l chooses
the proposition from x who is ranked higher than y in his list of preferences.
There is a matching between the bride x and the groom l. So, in the Gale and
Shapley’ model, the dowry is not negotiable. It may only be a means to show
the wealth of the bride’s father, to recognize the qualities of the groom... In
this case, the dowry is considered as a discrete variable.
It is also true for the determination of agents’ preferences in the Indian
matching market. However, in this market, if x and y propose to l, then l and x
must meet to negotiate the dowry. If an agreement is reached between the two
agents, then x and l are matched. If no, there is no matching between x and l.
So, as in the assignment game, the dowry is also the only factor that deter-
mines the matching between a bride and a groom. In this case, the transfers
between brides and grooms are continuous and so the dowry is considered as a
continuous variable.
Then, the Indian matching market appears as a sort of market, which is
neither completely discrete nor completely continuous.
The main purpose of this paper is to apply to the Indian matching market,
the methods used in the classical matching markets. These methods are used in
the case of a constant population and a population increase. So, in this paper, we
show that some results obtained in these classical matching markets (marriage
model and assignment game) are checked in the Indian marriage market.
In our model, if we consider that the dowry is a discrete variable; it is only
one of the factors that determine the preferences that men have over women
3Here, we consider that the dowry is a groom-price paid in cash.
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and so the matching, then our model coincide with the marriage model of Gale
and Shapley. Hence, the marriage model of Gale and Shapley (1962) is a special
case of our model. If we consider that all selection factors mentioned above cor-
respond to a unique monetary payment that is the object of negotiations, then
this model coincide with the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Hence, the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) is a special case of
our model.
In our paper, the preferences are defined by degrees of preference on an
ordered list of preferences. A groom is the best partner for a bride if this groom
has the higher degree of preference in her list of preference.
First, we study the model in the case of a constant population. We describe
an Indian matching mechanism, which is inspired from the algorithm of Eriksson
and Karlander (2000). The aim is to show that it is possible, by using an Indian
matching mechanism, to reach the minimum equilibrium dowry vector in the
Indian marriage market. We introduce in this mechanism a well known notion
in the matching theory, the augmenting paths. We prove that this mechanism
finds a stable outcome and that the dowry vector v˜ produced is the minimum
equilibrium dowry vector4.
We show that, in the Indian marriage model, the set of stable outcomes en-
joys nice properties such as the lattice property and the polarization of interests
that characterize the core of the classical matching models (see Gale and Shap-
ley (1962), Shapley and Shubik, 1972). We also show that in this market, the set
of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes are the same.
Hence, we prove that the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes is endowed
with properties, which characterize the set of stable outcomes in the model. So,
like in the set of stable outcomes, in the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes
among all competitive equilibrium outcomes there is one (and only one) which
is bride optimal (resp. optimal groom) meaning, in the context of the Indian
matching market, that all brides (resp. grooms) conclude the most favorable al-
liance under it as under any other competitive equilibrium outcome. Therefore,
the competitive dowry vector v˜ is the “worst” competitive equilibrium dowry
vector from the point of view of the grooms and it is called the minimum com-
petitive equilibrium dowry. There is also a maximum competitive equilibrium
dowry with symmetrical properties.
In the case of a population increase, we discuss the strategic questions and
the questions of comparative statics for all periods in which a marriage squeeze5
exists.
In India, there is a dowry inflation for which the Economics literature pro-
poses various hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. However, the literature
4Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) present two dynamic mechanisms that produce the
minimum competitive equilibria.
Bloch and Rao (2002) also prove a similar result in this Indian marriage market. They show
that, in equilibrium, the bride’s family offers the minimal dowry that the groom accepts.
5The “marriage squeeze” refers to a demographic imbalance between the numbers of po-
tential brides and potential grooms.
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offers two main explanations: the one based on the social status6 and the other
on demographic factors.
Rao (1993) explains the Indian dowry inflation by demographic factors: a
marriage squeeze is caused by the population growth (declining mortality leads
to a larger young cohorts), and this leads to a larger number of young women
of marriageable age (since women marry older men in general) and this excess
supply of women in the marriage market leads to an increase in dowry payments.
However, Anderson (2007) demonstrates that a marriage squeeze cannot
yield the dowry inflation. He proves that a marriage squeeze implies the dowry
deflation through time. He develops a matching model of marriage, which for-
mally analyzes the link between the dowry payments and the population growth.
In our paper, we follow Anderson to study the model in the case of a pop-
ulation increase. So, we consider that a marriage squeeze produces the dowry
deflation. We have two subgroups of brides: B1 composed of the brides that
reach marrying age (the younger brides) and B2 composed of the brides that
re-enter the market (the older brides).
First, we show that in the case of a population increase for all periods in
which a marriage squeeze exists, the Indian matching mechanism still produces
an equilibrium stable outcome.
The investigation of these questions in Indian marriage model with popu-
lation growth is of economic interest because it allows formally evaluating the
effects of a demographic shift on the individual behavior of each agent.
In the case of a population increase for all periods in which a marriage
squeeze exists, the study of strategic questions leads naturally to the following
questions in the Indian marriage market: is it always in the best interest of
women to behave honestly? Is that women manipulate the matching procedure
by misrepresenting their reservation dowries (in the goal to be matched with a
better partner)? Is that the domestic violence that exists after the wedding in
the Indian society is explaining by a manipulation of the matching procedure?
These questions are closely related and are of interest because these are well-
documented facts: that the dowry can represent sometimes six times the annual
wealth owned by the family’s woman (Rao (1993)); that the women in India are
victims of domestic violence and even murdered if they are unable to pay the
exorbitant dowries demanded by their husbands (Bloch and Rao (2002)).
We prove that, even in the case of a population increase for all periods
in which a marriage squeeze exists, in India, the mechanism which yields the
B−optimal stable outcome for one side of the market is strategy proof for that
side’s children. A similar result is obtained in the classical matching markets
(see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
Our results show that the brides have no interest to misrepresent their reser-
vation dowries under the B−optimal stable outcome because they cannot con-
clude a better alliance than their current alliance. Therefore, the domestic
violence is not explained by the strategic behavior that women might be able to
6Anderson (2003) offers an explanation based on the Indian caste system. Increasing wealth
dispersion, the search for status and social mobility within caste groups tend to increase dowry
payments, which are used as an indicator of social status.
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use in the matching procedure. The literature confirms our result because do-
mestic violence is usually due to the greed of husbands and in-laws. Indeed,
Rao (1993) explains that the dowry violence does not refer directly to marriage
related payments made at the time of the wedding, but to additional payments
demanded after the marriage by the groom’s family where the husband system-
atically abuses the wife in order to extract larger transfers.
The study of questions of comparative statics also leads to the one of ques-
tions the most interesting in Indian social science and which is of economic
interest: what are the effects on the payoffs’ agents of adding younger or older
brides to the market?
This question is very interesting because now in India, the fear of high
dowries leads parents to kill their daughters through either infanticide or sex-
selective abortion methods (Sudha and Rajan (1999), Arnold, Kishor and Roy
(2002)).
We prove that in the case of a population increase for a given period h, in
which a marriage squeeze exists, the entrance of a younger bride in the mar-
ket produces a result parallel to the results obtained in the classical matchings
models7: the entrance of a younger bride creates a competition among all brides.
By against, we observe that in the case of a population increase for all
periods in which a marriage squeeze exists, the entrance of a younger bride to
the market produces a result which has no parallel in the classical matching
models: there is a G − optimal stable outcome such that every groom and every
bride are worse off in the new market (M ′) than in the previous one (M). The
entry of younger brides affects all brides (v′j ≤ vj) and all grooms (u′i ≤ ui).
In fact, in the case of a population increase for a given period in which
there is a marriage squeeze, the adding of new brides to the market causes an
increase of payments’ grooms as it is observed in the literature of matching
markets. However, through time, a decrease of payments’grooms is observed.
Moreover, the return of an older bride in the market also produces a result
which has no parallel in the classical matching models: this entry has no effect
on the younger brides; there only exists a competition among all older brides.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mathematical
model. Section 3 is devoted to the main results in the case of a population
constant. Section 4 studies the effects of a demographic shift on the individual
behavior of each agent by examining strategic questions and the questions of
comparative statics. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Consider an Indian marriage market where each family is composed of one and
only one child, male or female. We know that in India, these are the families
that negotiate and arrange the wedding. But in this paper, to simplify the
notations, we only consider the children at the time of the marriage.
7See Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) and Mo (1988).
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In this section, we consider that the population of these children is constant.
We have an equal number of males and females, n, which are born at every
period t. So, in each period, the marriageable age is ε in B and δ in G. The
children either marry at the desirable ages (ε, δ) or later. In general, in the
Indian matching market ε < δ8.
Consequently, consider an Indian marriage market where there are two finite
and disjoint sets of children, B = {b1, ..., bi, ..., bn} and G = {g1, ..., gj , ..., gn} ,
with |B| = |G|. Thus, the family of a woman is represented by their daughter,
the bride b and the family of a man is represented by their son, the groom g.
The brides on one side form partnerships with the grooms on the opposite
side. Each child is interested in forming one partnership at most.
Here, to simplify, we consider that the factors which determine the prefer-
ences that brides on one side of the market have over on grooms on the opposite
side are: physical appearance, the Socio-Economic status and education. The
factors which determine the preferences that grooms on one side of the market
have over on brides on the opposite side are: physical appearance, the Socio-
Economic status, education and the value of dowry (proposed by brides). The
dowry negotiated is the factor that determines the matching between a bride and
a groom.
Each bride bi represents her preferences for the grooms she would like to
match by an ordered list preferences D(pi). On this list, the grooms are ranked
by according to degrees of preference σ with σ ∈ [0, 1]. The list of preferences
of bi given by D(pi) = gj , gk, gp, ..., bi, gl means that bi prefers gj to gk
with σij > σik. The bride bi prefers stay alone to matching with gl; so gl is
unacceptable to bi. A groom gj is acceptable to bi if and only if σij ≥ 0.
Each groom also expresses their preferences by an ordered list of preferences
D(pj). The brides are ranked by according to degrees of preference ρ with ρ ∈
[0, 1]. Thus, gj prefers bi to bk if and only if ρji > ρjk and bi is acceptable to
gj if and only if ρji ≥ 0.
To each pair (bi, gj) ∈ B × G, there is a nonnegative number αij , which can
be interpreted as the value of dowry that the bride bi is willing to pay for to
match with the groom gj . So, αij is the gain of transaction when a bride bi is
matched to a groom gj . For simplicity, we assume that the reservation dowry
of each child is zero and that there are no monetary transfers among children
from the same side. When the bride bi matches to the groom gj for a dowry vj
(in other words if x is a matching, which is an allocation of the brides to the
grooms) then the resulting utilities are ui = αij − vj for the bride bi and vj for
the groom gj .
We consider that any child (bride and groom) is free to remain unmatched,
in which case his utility is zero. Note that an unmatched bride (resp. an
unmatched groom) is considered as being matched to herself (resp. himself).
The marriage market with dowry is given by M = (B, G; σ, ρ, α) where σ and
ρ are the matrices of the degrees of preference and α is the dowry matrix.
8Many reasons explain this difference in ages such as the higher fertility of the younger
brides, the authority of a husband on a younger wife...(see Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993)
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Definition 1 A feasible matching x is a (m× n) matrix (xij)(bi, gj)∈B×G with
xij ∈ {0, 1} such that:
∑
gj∈G xij ≤ 1 for all bi ∈ B (1),
∑
bi∈B xij ≤ 1 for all
gj ∈ G (2) and xij ≥ 0 for all (bi, gj) ∈ B × G (3).
If xij = 1 (resp. xij = 0) we say that bi and gj are matched (resp. un-
matched) at x. If
∑
bi∈B xij = 0 (resp.
∑
gj∈G xij = 0) we say that gj ∈ G
(resp. bi ∈ B) is unmatched at x. If xij = 1 we can write x(bi) = gj or
x(gj) = bi; if xij = 0 we can write x(bi) = bi and x(gj) = gj .
Definition 2 An outcome is a matching x and a pair of vectors (u, v) called
payoff, with (u, v) ∈ Rn ×Rn. An agreement will be denoted by (u, v; x).
Thus, an agreement in this market is determined by specifying a matching
and the way in which the income within each pair is divided among the spouses.
Definition 3 An outcome (u, v; x) is feasible if (u, v; x) satisfies the following
conditions:
1. σij ≥ 0 and ρji ≥ 0 for all (bi , gj) ∈ B × G;
2. ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0, for all (bi, gj) ∈ B × G (individual rationality) and ui = 0
(resp. vj = 0) if bi (resp. gj) is unmatched.
3. ui + vj = αij if xij = 1.
Definition 4 An outcome is stable if it is feasible and if for all (bi, gj) ∈ B×G,
we have ui + vj ≥ αij.
If (u, v; x) is a feasible (resp. stable) outcome, then (u, v) is a feasible (resp.
stable) payoff and we say that the payoff (u, v) is compatible with the matching
x.
The bride bi is acceptable to gj if xij = 1, σij ≥ 0 and vj ≥ 0. Analogously,
the groom gj is acceptable to bi if xij = 1, ρji ≥ 0 and ui ≥ 0.
If the condition of Definition 4 is not satisfied for some pair (bi, gj) ∈ B×G,
then we say that (bi, gj) blocks the outcome. The pair (bi, gj) is called blocking
pair.
Therefore a feasible outcome (resp. feasible payoff) is stable if and only if it
does not have any blocking pair.
3 Main results in the case of a population con-
stant
The first main result is that there is always a stable outcome in the Indian
matching market.
Theorem 1 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, the set
of stable outcomes is non-empty.
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To demonstrate it, we describe an Indian matching mechanism that pro-
duces a stable outcome in this model. This algorithm which we call the Indian
matching mechanism finds a stable outcome via a kind of auction mechanism
of dowry in the Indian marriage market. We note that all dowries are integers.
3.1 The Indian matching mechanism
3.1.1 Preliminaries
We have the sets B and G, the factors of selection and the nonnegative integer αij
for each pair (bi, gj) ∈ B×G; we also have a dowry vector v˜ and a map x : B → G
that will both be modified during the algorithm until x is injective, that is, a
matching. We begin with the dowry vector v˜ = [0, ...., 0] (this algorithm is
initialized to zero. It is the minimum dowry to which a groom can accept to
match with a bride). In the course of algorithm, the dowries of grooms will only
increase, but never decrease; if at given point in the course of the mechanism,
we have x(bi) = gj , then we say that bi proposes to gj at this point; if at some
point, some groom gj has a proposition then, gj will always have a proposition
during the algorithm.
From the factors of selection, we define D(pi), for each bi ∈ B. The set
D(pi) depends on the current dowry vector v˜, it is not fixed. In each step, the
algorithm will modify the dowry vector and the map x so that it always satisfies
x(bi) ∈ D(pi). As soon as the map is injective, the algorithm stops.
The aim of the algorithm is to produce a matching x and payoff vectors u
and v satisfying the following conditions:
(i) σij ≥ 0 and ρji ≥ 0 for all (bi , gj) ∈ B × G;
(ii) ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0 for all (bi, gj) ∈ B × G;
(iii) If x(bi) = gj , then ui + vj = αij ;
(iv) gj ∈ D(pi) for all bi ∈ B.
Condition (i), Condition (ii) and Condition (iii) say that the payoffs are
compatible with the matching. Condition (iv) implies the stability, there is no
blocking pair if every bi is matched to his best possible partner.
We use in this algorithm, the notion of augmenting paths. In the course of
the algorithm, if we have the relation gj ∼ gk, then we say that gj is connected
to gk. That is, there exists a bride bi that proposes to gj and equally well could
have proposed to gk, so we have x(bi) = gj and gk ∈ D(pi). Let us extend this
relation by transitivity, so we say that gj1 is connected to gjn if there exists a
path gj1 ∼ gj2 ∼ ... ∼ gjn .
We divide the algorithm into three phases. In the first phase, each bride
(recall that to simplify the notations, we do not consider the families of each
child) propose to the best groom in D(pi). If it is possible to conclude an
agreement between the bride and the groom, so there is a matching. This part
runs as the Gale and Shapley algorithm for finding a stable matching in the
marriage model; but with a negotiable dowry. However, some groom may still
have several propositions; that is, some groom may have received more than one
proposition. In Phase II, we find augmenting paths from G−children that are
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already matched under x to G−children that have no propositions. At the end
of Phase II, there are no such augmenting paths, so if x is still not injective,
then there must be an G−children that has several proposers but which is not
part of an augmenting path. In Phase III, the dowries are increased for all such
G−children and all G−children connected to them, and everything is repeated
again.
The algorithm has two important properties: the dowries v˜ never decrease
and if at some point gj gets a proposer, then gj will never again be without pro-
posers during the algorithm. The algorithm will stop when each gj is matched
or has opted to stay unmatched.
3.1.2 Determination of lists of preferences
All brides propose to G. We have B and G children and degrees of preference σ
and ρ, and the nonnegative number integer αij for each pair (bi, gj) ∈ B × G.
Here, the dowry is considered as a discrete variable; it is one of the factors that
determine the preferences that grooms have over brides.
Define a function γij(d) that gives us the value of gj to bi if the dowry of gj
is d, that is, if for gj the dowry vj = d. The value will tacitly depend also on
the current map x :
γij(d) =
{
αij − d if (bi, gj) ∈ B × G
0 if x(bi) 6= gj
Define D(pi), for each bi ∈ B, as the set of potential partners at the dowry
d. That is,
D(pi) =
{
σij = max {σkj : µ(bk) = gj }
γk : γik(vk) = max
j
γij(vj)
}
.
Each bride and each groom define their degrees of preference for potential
partners according to some selection factors. So, we determine for each agent a
list of preferences. These are the list of acceptable partners. An agent may be
indifferent between two partners on its list of preferences. However, the dowry’s
transactions will determine its choice. It will decide to match or to stay alone.
3.1.3 The dowry auction mechanism
Consider that the dowry is paid in cash; all payoffs are integers. Then, we use
an integral productivity matrix. All brides propose to G. We have B and G
children with their lists of preferences, and the nonnegative number integer αij
for each pair (bi, gj) ∈ B×G; we also have a dowry vector v˜ and a map x : B → G
that will both be modified during the algorithm until x is injective, that is, a
matching. We set v˜ = [0, ...., 0] and choose x for every x(bi) ∈ D(pi) for every
bi (this is possible, since from the definition every D(pi) is always nonempty).
Phase I
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Each bride announces a value of dowry to his favorite groom (s). That is, she
proposes to the groom (s) that is ranked first in D(pi). Note that it is possible
to be indifferent. Every groom studies the offer from the most preferred bride
on his list of preferences. If it is possible to conclude an agreement between a
groom and a bride, so there is a matching; if x is injective, then the algorithm
stops. By against, if some groom still have several propositions, we move to the
Phase II.
Phase II
Let bkn denote a proposer that could proposed equally well to gkn+1 instead
of gkn . Suppose that we find a path gk1 ∼ gk2 ∼ ... ∼ gkm such that gk1 has at
least one extra proposer bi except for bk1 while gkm has no proposer at all. Then
we modify x by setting x(bk1) := gk2 , ..., x(bkm−1) := gkm . For all other b ∈ B,
x maps as before. This augments the image of x by one groom, gkm . Now Part
I is run again.
As long as, this alternative is possible, the process is repeated and if several
possibilities are open, choose one.
Phase III
Let E be the set of all g ∈ G that are (1) connected to some g ∈ G who
has more than one proposer, and (2) not connected to any g ∈ G that have no
proposal. Modify the dowry vector v˜ by increasing vj by one, for all gj ∈ E. Now
phase II is run again. The whole process is repeated until x becomes injective.
The dowry vector v˜ sometimes increases, but never decreases. When the
algorithm halts, each bride is either matched or has been rejected by every
groom on his preference list.
Phase III must eventually stop and, hence the algorithm, must eventually
stop. Indeed, each gj that, at some point, has a proposition then, gj will always
have a proposition. In each step, we have x(bi) = D(pi). We set in the first step
v˜ = [0, ...., 0]. Thus, if some gk does not have a proposer at some point, then
vk is still zero, in which case the payoff γik(vk) of vk for bi is greater than zero.
When gj has a proposer bi and the dowry is allowed to increase sufficiently,
we will arrive at a non-positive value of the dowry of gj for bi, γij(vj) ≤ 0.
Then gj /∈ D(pi) and we must have gk ∈ D(pi) for some bi. When Phase III is
used, there must eventually exist a path from some gj with several proposers
to gk. When Phase II is used, gk gets a proposer. In this way, all grooms must
eventually get proposers, so x is a matching.
The dowry vector is determined by the algorithm, and will be nonnegative.
Assume that x(bi) = gj . Then, we set ui = αij − vj if (bi, gj) ∈ B × G. The
unmatched g ∈ G have zero dowries, they have always been of positive value to
all B− children, and the same thing must of course hold for the matched pairs.
So all ui are non-negative.
Thus, the Indian matching mechanism halts. Grooms who did not receive
any acceptable proposition, and brides who were rejected by all grooms from
their sets of potential partners, stay alone.
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We present this algorithm via the following example.
Example 1 Consider B = {b1, b2, b3, b4} and G = {g1, g2, g3, g4} in the
case of a constant population. Consider the factors such that the physical ap-
pearance, the Socio-Economic status, the education and the value of dowry.
Consider the following degrees of preference and dowry matrix
g1 g2 g3 g4
b1 (0, 7; 0, 9; 14) (0, 6; 0, 6; 10) (0, 3; 0, 5; 8) (0, 2; 0, 1; 4)
b2 (0, 06; 0, 6; 10) (0, 5; 0, 7; 12) (0, 3; 0, 6; 10) (0, 9; 1; 17)
b3 (0, 05; 0, 5; 8) (0, 1; 0, 6; 10) (0, 8; 0, 9; 14) (1; 0, 9; 16)
b4 (0, 9; 0, 9; 14) (0, 7; 0, 8; 13) (0, 2; 0, 6; 10) (0, 1; 0, 4; 10)
Table 1: Degrees of preference and dowry matrix
Determination of lists of preferences
The brides b1, b2, b3 and b4 announce their degrees of preference for each
bride. The grooms also announce their degrees of preference for each groom.
So, we determine the preference lists of each agent. We have:
b1 = g1, g2, g3, g4 g1 = b1 ∼ b4, b2, b3
b2 = g4, g2, g3, g1 g2 = b4, b2, b3 ∼ b1
b3 = g4, g3, g2, g1 g3 = b3, b4 ∼ b2, b1
b4 = g1, g2, g3, g4 g4 = b2, b3, b4, b1
The dowry auction mechanism
g1 g2 g3 g4
b1 14
∗ 10 8 4
b2 10 12 10 17
∗
b3 8 10 14 16
∗
b4 14
∗ 13 10 10
Each bride proposes to his favorite groom. So b1 and b4 proposes to g1,
b2 and b3 to g4. The grooms g1 and g4 have two proposers. It is impossible
to conclude an agreement between these grooms and these brides. We proceed
to Phase II. None of the conditions in Phase II are satisfied, so we proceed to
Phase III. In Phase III, we identify the set E = {g1, g4} as being of the desired
kind: the agents in E are not connected to any g ∈ G that have no proposal.
The groom g1 has two propositions from b1 and b4, he is not connected to any
g ∈ G, and g4 also has two propositions from b2 and b3; he is not connected to
anyone else. The grooms g2 and g3 have no proposition. Raise the dowry by
one on both g1 and g4, to obtain v˜ = [1, 0, 0, 1]. Recompute the values and the
map:
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g1 g2 g3 g4
b1 13
∗ 10 8 4
b2 10 12 10 17
∗
b3 8 10 14 16
∗
b4 13
∗ 13∗ 10 10
Now, we see that the dowries on g1 and g2 have been raised enough for b4
to find it worth considering proposing to g2 (the second groom is his preference
list) instead. So in Phase II, we identify the path g1 ∼ g2, where g1 has two pro-
posers, g2 has one proposer; g4 still has two propositions from b2 and b3. This is
an augmenting path, so we change the map accordingly to x = [g1, b2, b3, g2] .
Recompute the values and the map:
g1 g2 g3 g4
b1 13 10 8 4
b2 10 12 10 16
∗
b3 8 10 14 15
∗
b4 13 13 10 10
We proceed to Phase II. None of the conditions in Phase II are satisfied, so
we proceed to Phase III. In Phase III, we identify the set E = {g1, g4} as being
of the desired kind: the groom g4 has two propositions from b2 and b3; he is not
connected to anyone else. The groom g3 has no proposition. Raise the dowry
by one on both g1 and g4, to obtain v˜ = [1, 0, 1, 0]. Recompute the values and
the map:
g1 g2 g3 g4
b1 13 10 8 4
b2 10 12 10 15
∗
b3 8 10 14
∗ 14∗
b4 13 13 10 10
We see that the dowries on g4 have been raised enough for b3 to find it
worth considering proposing to g3 (the second groom is his preference list)
instead. This is an augmenting path, so we change the map accordingly to
x = [g1, g4, g3, g2] . Now the map is injective, so the algorithm stops. Thus,
we have (b1, g1), (b2, g4), (b3, g3) and (b4, g2); and from the dowry vector we
get payoffs v˜ = [1, 0, 0, 2] and u˜ = [13, 13, 14, 15].
3.2 Characterization of the core of the Indian matching
market
In this section, that the set of stable payoffs is a convex and complete lattice
under the partial orders B and G. We will need some results to prove it.
The following lemma implies that at a stable outcome, the monetary trans-
fers occur only between B and G − children who are matched to each other.
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Lemma 1 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, let (u,
v; x) and (u′, v′; x′) be stable outcomes. Then, (i) ui + vj = αij for all pairs
(bi, gj) such that xij = 1; (ii) ui = 0 (resp. vj = 0) for all unmatched bi (resp.
for all unmatched gj) at x.
Proof. Let Si (respectively Sj) be the set of all unmatched bi (respectively gj)
at x. Then by feasibility of (u, v; x) :∑
B
ui +
∑
G
vj =
∑
B×G
(ui + vj)xij +
∑
bi∈Si
ui +
∑
gj∈Sj
vj =
∑
B×G
αijxij .
Now we apply the definition of stability.
We show via the following proposition that the interests of brides and grooms
are opposed in the set of stable payoffs.
Proposition 1 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, let
(u, v; x) and (u′, v′; x′) be stable outcomes. Then, if x′ij = 1, u
′
i > ui implies
v′j < vj.
Proof. Suppose v′j ≥ vj . Then αij = u′i + v′j > ui + vj ≥ αij , which is a
contradiction.
Define the pointwise maximum (u ∨ v) = u and the pointwise minimum
(u ∧ v) = v, for any vectors u and v of the same dimension.
Definition 5 Let (u, v) and (u′, v′) be both stable payoffs. Let x be some
equilibrium matching. We define u and v as follows: (i) for every b ∈ B,
u = max {ui, u′i} ; (ii) for every g ∈ G, v = min
{
vj , v
′
j
}
. Similarly, we define
u and v.
Lemma 2 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, let (u,
v) and (u′, v′) be in the set of stable outcomes. Then, the outcomes (u, v; x)
and (u, v; x) are both allocations of this set.
Proof. For any bi and gj , we have either
ui + vj = u
′
i + vj ≥ u′i + v′j ≥ αij or
ui + vj = ui + vj ≥ ui + vj ≥ αij .
We know that if (u, v) and (u′, v′) are stable outcomes, so these payoffs are
compatible with x. Then ui ≥ 0 and vj ≥ 0.
Suppose that, from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, if xij = 1 then,
ui + vj = u
′
i + v
′
j = αij or
ui + vj = ui + vj = αij .
Then, ∑
bi∈B
ui +
∑
gj∈G
vj =
∑
x(bi)=gj
αijxij .
Hence (u, v; x) and (u, v; x) are also in the set of stable outcomes.
Define the partial orders ≥B and ≥G : (i) (u, v) ≥B (u′, v′) if and only if
ui ≥B u′i and vj ≤G v′j for all bi in B and gj in G; (ii) (u, v) ≥G (u′, v′) if and
only if ui ≤B u′i and vj ≥G v′j for all bi in B and gj in G.
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Theorem 2 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, the set
of stable outcomes forms a lattice under ≥B and ≥G.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 2 and the definition of a lattice.
The existence of a complete lattice structure implies the existence of two
extreme points in the set of stable outcomes: the B− optimal stable payoff and
the G−optimal stable payoff. These points show that there exists a coincidence
of interests among brides which are on the same side of the market and a conflict
of interest between grooms that are on opposite side. Thus, in the context of
the Indian matching market, under the B − optimal stable outcome, each bride
concludes the most favorable agreement among all the stable agreements for
the brides and each groom concludes the worst agreement among all the stable
agreements for the grooms. Similarly, under the G − optimal stable outcome,
each groom concludes the most favorable agreement and each brides the worst
agreement.
The following theorem states that in the set of stable outcomes, the equi-
librium stable outcome for brides is the best outcome for brides and the worst
outcome for grooms; there is another equilibrium stable outcome with symmet-
ric properties.
Definition 6 A B−optimal stable payoff gives to each bride in B, the maximum
total payoff among all stable payoffs. Similarly, we define an G − optimal stable
payoff.
Theorem 3 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, the
outcome produced by the Indian matching mechanism is a B − optimal stable
outcome.
Proof. Let (v˜1, v˜2, . . . , v˜n) be the outcomes of the grooms in B − optimal
matching. We enumerate the steps in the algorithm as follows: every turn of
proposals in Phase I counts as one step. Every construction of a path in Phase
II and every application of Phase III also counts as one step.
Let (v
(φ)
1 , v
(φ)
2 , . . . , v
(φ)
n ) be the outcomes of grooms at step (φ) in the algo-
rithm. We want to show that v
(φ)
j ≤ v˜j for all gj ∈ G. We notice that all the
v
(φ)
j are non-decreasing and can only increase in Phase III.
Assume that v
(φ)
j ≤ v˜j for all gj ∈ G to step i and show that v(φ+1)j ≤ v˜j .
Phase I: The dowries are announced. Suppose v
(φ+1)
k ≥ v˜k. The increase
of vk comes from gk accepting a proposition from bl at step φ + 1. We claim
that there is no stable matching x giving gk an outcome smaller than v
(φ+1)
k .
Indeed, suppose x (gk) = bp and x (bl) = gd. In this matching we must have
vd ≥ v˜d ≥ v(φ)d . Thus:
- If vd > v
(φ)
d then bl must offer a higher dowry to gk than gd, given the
G − outcomes in x, since bl at least did not prefer gd to gk at step i. Then
(bl, gk) blocks x.
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- If vd = v
(φ)
d , we can show that the only possibility is that gd ∼ gk in Phase
II. Thus gd must be contained in a set E, such that gk /∈ E, and such that E is
overdemanded (that is, the set Y : bi ∈ Y ⇒ D(pi) ⊆ E contains more elements
than E) at step φ− 1. It is possible to show that the path containing gd and gk
is the only augmenting path at step φ. This means that every stable matching
with vd = v
(φ)
d must match bl to gk. This shows that there can be no stable
matching such that x(bl) = gd.
Phase III: At step φ+1 the outcomes for the grooms in G in an overdemanded
set E are raised one step. Suppose gk ∈ E and v(φ+1)k > v˜k. Then there is a set
S ⊆ E such that gk ∈ S and v(φ+1)k = v˜k +1, that is, v(φ)k = v˜k for all gk ∈ S.
The B − optimal matching xB has vp ≥ v(φ)p for all p such that gp /∈ S. So, we
can show that S must be overdemanded at these outcomes. Since the stable
matching xB cannot contain an overdemanded set, this is impossible.
3.3 Coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and
the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes
We will show in this section that the dowry auction mechanism produces a
dowry vector v˜, which is the minimum equilibrium dowry.
Definition 7 The dowry vector v˜ is called competitive if there is a matching x
such that x (bi) ∈ D(pi) for all bi ∈ B. A matching x such that x (bi) ∈ D(pi)
for all bi ∈ B is said to be competitive for the dowry v˜.
At competitive dowry v˜, each bride can be matched with a groom in her set
of potential partners D(pi). We know that in the course of the algorithm there
may have an augmenting path; so there may be more than one competitive
matching for the same dowry v˜.
Definition 8 The pair (v˜, x) is a competitive equilibrium if v˜ is competitive, x
is competitive for v˜ and if σij = 0 and vj = 0 for any unmatched groom gj.
For each bi, at a competitive equilibrium (v˜, x), x (bi) ∈ D(pi) and there is
no blocking pair under v˜. So, at every competitive equilibrium, not only does
every groom matches to an acceptable bride, but no unmatched bride has a
utility higher than zero. If (v˜, x) is a competitive equilibrium, v˜ will be called
an equilibrium dowry vector.
Definition 9 The outcome (u˜, v˜; x) is a competitive equilibrium if (a) σij ≥ 0
and ρji ≥ 0 for all (bi , gj) ∈ B × G; (b) ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0 for all (bi, gj) ∈ B × G,
(c) vj = 0 if the groom gj remains unmatched, (d) x is a feasible matching such
that x (bi) = gj then gj ∈ D(pi) for all bi ∈ B.
A competitive equilibrium outcome is a feasible allocation x plus a payoff
composed of a dowry vector v˜ of grooms and a payoff vector of brides u˜. If (u˜,
v˜; x) is a competitive equilibrium outcome, we say that (u˜, v˜) is a competitive
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equilibrium payoff, (v˜; x) is a competitive equilibrium and v˜ is a competitive or
an equilibrium dowry vector.
The following lemma shows that the competitive equilibrium outcomes are
stable outcomes.
Lemma 3 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, (a) if
(u, v; x) is a competitive equilibrium outcome, then (u, v; x) is a stable outcome
and (b) if (u, v; x) is a stable outcome, then (u, v; x) is a competitive equilibrium
outcome.
Proof. We are going to prove (a); the assertion (b) can be proved symmetri-
cally.
Let (u, v; x) be a competitive equilibrium outcome. Then, by Definition 9,
ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0 for all (bi, gj) ∈ B × G and vj = 0 if the groom gj remains
unmatched, it follows that (u, v; x) is a feasible outcome. In addition, x (bi) ∈
D(pi) for every bi ∈ B; then, for all bi ∈ D(pi), ui = αij − vj ≥ ui = αik − vk
for all gj ∈ D(pi) and gk /∈ D(pi). We know that if gj ∈ D(pi) for all bi ∈ B,
then there is no blocking pair. Therefore, by Definition 4, (u, v; x) is a stable
outcome and x is compatible with (u, v).
Thus, to each competitive equilibrium (v, x), we can associate a stable out-
come (u, v; x) and even to each stable outcome (u, v; x) we can associate a
competitive equilibrium (v, x).
Hence, from Definition 6, we can deduce the following definition
Definition 10 A B− optimal competitive equilibrium payoff gives to each chil-
dren in B the maximum total payoff among all competitive equilibrium payoffs.
Similarly, we define an G − optimal competitive equilibrium payoff.
We have proved that: a stable outcome is a competitive equilibrium outcome
by Lemma 3, the set of stables outcomes is a lattice by Theorem 2 and there
exists a unique B−optimal stable payoff and a unique G−optimal stable payoff
by Theorem 3. Then, as the B − optimal stable payoff, which is the unique
optimal outcome for all brides, there is a unique vector of equilibrium dowries
that is optimal for the G − children.
Hence, from Theorems 2 and 3, and Lemma 3,
Theorem 4 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, the
set of competitive equilibrium outcomes is a complete lattice: there exists a
B−optimal competitive equilibrium outcome and an G − optimal competitive
equilibrium outcome.
The dowry auction mechanism computes the minimum competitive equilib-
rium dowry that corresponds to the G − optimal competitive equilibrium out-
come and the maximum competitive equilibrium dowry that corresponds to the
B − optimal competitive equilibrium outcome.
Hence, immediately from Theorem 4,
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Theorem 5 In the Indian marriage market, with a constant population, the
dowry vector v˜ produced by the matching mechanism is the minimum equilibrium
dowry.
Proof. Suppose that there exists any other equilibrium dowry v such that
v˜  v. Every turn of proposals in Phase I, each construction of a path in Phase
II and each application of Phase III in the algorithm counts as one step. Now
at step t = 1 of the dowry auction mechanism, we have v˜1 = 0 so v˜1 ≤ v.
Let t the last step of the dowry auction mechanism at which v˜t ≤ v and let
E1 = { gj : v˜j(t+ 1) > vj} . Let E be the minimal overdemanded set whose
dowries are increased at step t+ 1, so E = { gj : v˜j(t+ j) > v˜j(t)} , so E1 ⊂ E.
Show that E − E1 is nonempty and overdemanded.
Let G = { gj : D(pi)(v˜(t)) ⊂ E} . We know that E is overdemanded, that is
|G| > |E| . (1)
Let G1 = { bi ∈ G : D(pi)(v˜(t)) ∩ E1 6= ∅} .
Set D(pi)(v) ⊂ E1 for all i in G1. Indeed, choose gj in E1 and in D(pi)(v˜(t)).
If gk /∈ E, then bi prefers gj to gk at the dowry v˜(t) because bi ∈ G, but
v˜k(t) ≤ vk and v˜j(t) = vj . So bi prefers gj to gk at the dowry v. On the other
hand, if gk ∈ E −E1, then bi prefers gj at least as well as gk at the dowry v˜(t),
but v˜k(t) < v˜k(t+1) ≤ vk (and v˜j(t) = vj), thus bi prefers gj to gk at the dowry
v.
Now since v is an equilibrium dowry there are no overdemanded sets at the
dowry v so
|G1| ≤ |E1| . (2)
From (1) and (2), |G−G1| > |E − E1| , so G − G1 6= ∅ and G − G1 ={
bi ∈ G : D(pi)(v˜(t)) ∈ E − E1
}
. Then E−E1 6= ∅ and E−E1 is overdemanded,
contradiction. Hence, E is not a minimal overdemanded set.
4 Effects of population growth in Indian mar-
riage markets
In this section, we consider that there is a one shot population growth. Assume
that γn brides and grooms are born in period 0 (instead of n as in Section 2)
with 1 < γ < 29. Thereafter, the number of births returns to n for all periods
t ≥ 1. The unmatched agents are in the marriage market in each period. Note
that the divorced agents does not enter the market; there is not the remarriage
in our marriage market.
From periods 0 to ε − 1, the population growth has no effect on the brides
and the grooms who want to match; we always have n brides and grooms who
want to match. The marriageable ages always are ε and δ (recall that ε and
δ are the marriageable ages of brides and grooms respectively). So all results
obtained in the preceding sections are still checked.
9This assumption ensures that the year beyond the most desired age which brides marry
is equal to 1. So that bridal delay will only be until one year.
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Now, consider the periods ε ≤ t < δ. Brides and grooms who are born in
period 0 reach the marriageable age. As we note in Section 2, in India the
marriageable age is ε < δ. So to the period ε, we have γn brides of age ε against
n grooms, which reached the marriageable age δ, with n < γn. Therefore, the
number of brides entering the marriage market increases for periods ε ≤ t < δ.
The marriage squeeze occurs in the periods ε ≤ t < δ. There are most of brides
entering the marriage market than the grooms.
To study the consequence of a marriage squeeze, in this section, we consider
the periods ε ≤ t < δ.
We have B = {b1, ..., bi, ..., bm} and G = {g1, ..., gj , ..., gn} with |B| > |G| .
We does know that to ε ≤ t < δ, among the brides, they are brides, which reach
the marriageable age and which enter the marriage market and the brides, which
rejected in the preceding periods by grooms and which re-enter the marriage
market.
So the set of brides is composed of two subgroups: B1 composed of the brides
that enter the market and B2 composed of the brides that re-enter the market.
We have B = B1 ∪B2 and B1 ∩B2 = ∅. In B1, the age of brides is ε (ε < δ) and
in B2, the age of brides is ν ≤ δ, (with ε < ν).
In this paper, for all periods in which there is a marriage squeeze (ε ≤ t < δ),
we follow Anderson (Anderson, 2007). Anderson notes that, for all periods in
which there is a marriage squeeze, the dowry payments of older brides are falling.
The marriage squeeze causes necessarily a dowry deflation because some brides
must be willing to delay marriage and re-enter the marriage market when older
and they anticipate lower dowries in future.
The brides define their preferences as in Section 2. By against, for the
grooms, we add the age to the factors of selection. We know that in the Indian
marriage market, the men prefer to marry younger women whereas women prefer
to marry older men. So, to determine the lists of preferences, the age is one of
the factors that determine the preferences that grooms have over brides.
Note that to equal dowry, a younger bride is preferred to an older bride.
By following Anderson, we assume that, for all periods ε ≤ t < δ, in which a
marriage squeeze exists, the older brides propose the lower dowries (these brides
are only willing to delay marriage that if they have anticipate lower dowries in
future) and the younger brides propose the higher dowries.
4.1 The Indian matching mechanism after a one shot pop-
ulation growth (periods ε ≤ t < δ)
The Indian matching mechanism is not changed. We know that the younger
brides offer the higher dowries because the brides in B2 anticipate the lower
dowries. So, they propose lower dowries than the dowries proposed when they
were younger brides. So, the younger brides are matched first (when they offer
enough to be preferred to the older brides). Note that, with the population
growth |B| > |G| , then there are some brides that will stay alone and re-enter
the market at another period or they will stay unmatched. So, when, the Indian
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matching mechanism halts, grooms who did not receive any acceptable propo-
sition, and brides who were rejected by all grooms from their sets of potential
partners, stay alone or re-enter at another period.
Illustrate the Indian matching mechanism after a one shot population growth
by an example.
Example 2 Consider that there is a one shot population growth. Consider, for
all periods in which there is a marriage squeeze (ε ≤ t < δ), B = {by1, bo2, bo3, by4, by5, by6, by7}
and G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5}. The factors of selection are the physical appear-
ance, the Socio-Economic status, the education, the age and the value of dowry.
So, consider the following degrees of preference and dowry matrix
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
by1 (0, 6; 0, 6; 14) (0, 8; 0, 9; 18) (0, 3; 0, 8; 15) (0, 2; 0, 5; 14) (0, 4; 0, 7; 15)
bo2 (0, 6; 0, 6; 14) (0, 7; 0, 5; 14) (0, 9; 0, 4; 14) (0, 8; 0, 4; 15) (0, 6; 0, 6; 14)
bo3 (0, 8; 0, 5; 14) (0, 7; 0, 4; 14) (0, 9; 0, 5; 15) (1; 0, 3; 14) (0, 7; 0, 5; 14)
by4 (1; 0, 9; 18) (0, 8; 0, 6; 14) (0, 3; 0, 7; 16) (0, 7; 0, 5; 14) (0, 2; 0, 4; 13)
by5 (0, 6; 0, 7; 14) (0, 7; 0, 7; 15) (0, 9; 0, 9; 19) (0, 3; 0, 7; 15) (0, 1; 0, 3; 13)
by6 (0, 6; 0, 7; 14) (0, 5; 0, 6; 14) (0, 3; 0, 6; 14) (0, 8; 0, 8; 18) (0; 0, 5; 14)
by7 (0, 5; 0, 6; 14) (0, 4; 0, 5; 14) (0, 6; 0, 7; 14) (0, 5; 0, 6; 14) (0, 7; 0, 6; 14)
Table 4: Degrees of preference and dowry matrix
Determination of lists of preferences
The brides announce their degrees of preference for each groom. The grooms
also announce their degrees of preference for each bride.
So, we determine the preference lists of each agent. We have:
by1 = g2, g1, g5, g3, g4 g1 = b
y
4, b
y
5 ∼ by6, by7 ∼ by1, bo2, bo3
bo2 = g3, g4, g2, g5, g1 g2 = b
y
1, b
y
5, b
y
4 ∼ by6, by7, bo2, bo3
bo3 = g4, g3, g1, g2 ∼ g5 g3 = by5, by1, by4, by6, by7, bo3, bo2
by4 = g1, g2, g4, g3, g5 g4 = b
y
6, b
y
5, b
y
7, b
y
4 ∼ by1, bo2, bo3
by5 = g3, g2, g1, g4, g5 g5 = b
y
1, b
y
7, b
o
2, b
y
6, b
o
3, b
y
4, b
y
5,
by6 = g4, g1, g2, g3, g5
by7 = g5, g1 ∼ g4, g2 ∼ g3
We know that if the younger bride propose a dowry which is equal to that
proposed by an older bride, then the younger bride is match first.
The Indian matching mechanism produces the following stable outcomes:
(u1, v1; x1) with x1 : (by1, g2), (b
o
2, b
o
2), (b
o
3, b
o
3), (b
y
4, g1), (b
y
5, g3), (b
y
6, g4)
and (by7, g5);
(u2, v2; x2) with x2 : (by1, g3), (b
o
2, b
o
2), (b
o
3, b
o
3), (b
y
4, g4), (b
y
5, g2), (b
y
6, g1)
and (by7, g5).
The outcome (u1, v1; x1) is a stable equilibrium outcome. 
Hence, the following theorem
Theorem 6 In the Indian matching market, with a population increase, for all
periods ε ≤ t < δ, in which a marriage squeeze exists, the outcome produced by
the Indian matching mechanism is a B − optimal stable outcome.
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4.2 Strategic questions and questions of comparative stat-
ics
4.2.1 Strategic questions
A stable matching mechanism, in this section, means a function that for any B,
G and any stated reservation dowries (di, dj) yields a stable allocation for the
market M = (B, G; αij ; σij , ρij ; di, dj).
We consider that each bride sets a dowry di for the grooms (whose σij ≥ 0),
which is the dowry above which it will not match and each groom similarly sets a
dowry di for the brides (whose ρij ≥ 0), which is the dowry below which he will
not match, if bi and gj form a partnership. In this case, we may take αij to be
the gains from cooperation between bi and gj ; that is αij = max {0, di − dj} .
So, if gj accepts the proposition from bi at the dowry d (that is, if bi matches
to gj for the dowry d) (and if no other monetary transfers are made), then the
individuals payoffs will be:
ui ≥ di − d and vj ≥ d− dj if (bi, gj) ∈ B × G.
Let M = (B, G; αij ; σij , ρij ; di, dj) be some market. Under the mechanism
that produces a stable outcome, let d′i and d
′
j be the selected strategies by
brides B and grooms G, respectively. The resulting outcome, (u, v; x) is the
stable outcome for M ′ = (B, G; α′ij ; σ′ij , ρ′ij ; d′i, d′j) obtained after normalization.
If (u, v; x) is produced when the bride bi misrepresents her reservation dowry,
that is di 6= d′i for at least one gj , then bi ’s true individual payoff under (u, v;
x) is:
u∗ij = αij − vij if (bi, gj) ∈ B × G;
u∗ij = 0 if bi is unmatched under x.
Similarly, we define the true individual payoff of a groom gj .
In the Indian matching mechanism, each bride announces a dowry, which is
proposed to her set of potential partners D(pi). We have demonstrated that
this mechanism produces an optimal stable outcome. Here, we examine the
manipulability questions that arise when this mechanism that finds the optimal
stable outcome is used. We study the manipulability of the Indian matching
mechanism by asking the following question: Is it always in each bride’s best
interest to state her true reservation dowry in the case of a marriage squeeze?
We first define a dominant strategy and a strategy-proof mechanism.
Definition 11 A dominant strategy for a bride bi is a strategy that is the best
response to all possible sets of selected strategies by the other brides.
Definition 12 A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy, for
all children to reveal their true reservation dowries.
As in the classical matching markets, the B−optimal stable matching mech-
anism is non manipulable by all brides. In others words, the brides do not
improve their agreement if they manipulate the Indian matching procedure.
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Theorem 7 In the Indian matching market, with a population increase, for all
periods ε ≤ t < δ, in which a marriage squeeze exists, the matching mechanism
that produces the B−optimal stable outcome (in terms of the stated reservation
dowries) makes it a dominant strategy for each bride to state her true reservation
dowry.
Proof. Consider the bride bi who states her true reservation dowry di. Given
the stated reservation dowries of the others, if the bride bi misrepresents her
reservation dowry. Her lie does not improve her utility and that of other brides.
Indeed, if her reservation dowry d1 = λ is the highest stated dowry, then
she matches for a dowry d2 = d, which gives her a positive utility whenever d2
is strictly less than d1 = di. If she had stated a different reservation dowry, the
outcome would not change at all so long as her stated dowry remains above d2.
But, if she states a reservation dowry d′i < d2, the bride bi remains unmatched
and receives the zero payoff.
Now, suppose that the bride bi states that d1 6= λ. Then, bi receives the
zero payoff and would continue to do so for any stated dowry d′i ≤ d1. The only
way bi can change her payoff is (when d1 > di) by stating a reservation dowry
d′i > d1, but in this case she matches to a groom for a dowry greater than her
true reservation dowry, which gives her a negative utility. Thus, it is dominant
strategy for each bride to state her true reservation dowry.
4.2.2 Questions of comparative statics
To study the questions of comparative statics, first we study the effect of adding
of new brides to the market on the period h, in which there is a marriage squeeze;
then we generalize these results for all periods ε ≤ t < δ in which a marriage
squeeze exists.
Consider the period h (with h ∈ [ε, δ[) in which there is a marriage squeeze,
to study the effects of adding of new brides to the market.
Now, we want know if the adding of new brides to the market produces the
same results as those known in the literature.
In the literature, the adding of one or more brides to the Indian matching
market increases the grooms’ payoffs (v′j ≥ vj) and decreases the bride’s payoffs
(u′i ≤ ui)10. In fact, in the case of a population increase for a given period
in which there is a marriage squeeze, the adding of new brides to the market
causes a dowry inflation.
In the period h, if a younger bride enters the market, the comparative static
results obtained are parallel to results obtained in the classical assignment game.
By against, it is not the case when it is an older bride that re-enters the market.
Theorem 8 In the Indian matching market, with a population increase, for the
period h, in which a marriage squeeze exists: (a) let (u, v) be a G−optimal stable
payoff under M. If by∗i enters the market, then there exists some G − optimal
10See Demange and Gale (1985), Mo (1988) or Roth and Sotomayor (chapter 8, 1990).
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stable payoff (u′, v′) for the new market M ′ such that: (i) u′i ≤ ui for every
bi ∈ B; (ii) v′j ≥ vj for every gj ∈ G.
(b) let (u, v) be a G − optimal stable payoff under M. If bo∗i re-enters the
market, then there exists some G − optimal stable payoff (u′′, v′′) for the new
market M ′′ such that: (i) u′′i = ui for every b
y
i ∈ B; (ii) u′′i ≤ ui for every
boi ∈ B; (iii) v′′j ≥ vj for every gj ∈ G.
(c) let (u, v) be a B − optimal stable payoff under M. If g∗j enters the
market, then there exists some B − optimal stable payoff (u′′′, v′′′) for the new
market M ′′′ such that: (i) u′′′i ≥ ui for every bi ∈ B; (ii) v′′′j ≤ vj for every
gj ∈ G.
Proof. Prove (a).
For the period h, let (bi, gj) ∈ (B × G). Suppose that u′i < ui for every
bi ∈ B. If v′j ≤ vj for every gj ∈ G, then u′i + v′j < ui + vj and so (bi, gj) blocks
(u′, v′), which is a contradiction.
Statement (c) can be proved symmetrically.
Prove (b).
For the period h, let boi ∈ B2. First, we are going to show that u′i ≤ ui
for every boi ∈ B. Suppose that u′i > ui. Then, there is some gj ∈ G such that
x′(boi ) = gj . If v
′
j ≥ vj , then u′i + v′j > ui + vj ; so (boi , gj) blocks (u, v), which
is a contradiction.
Now, we are going to show that u′i = ui for every b
y
i ∈ B.
(1) Suppose that u′i > ui for every b
y
i ∈ B. Then, there is some gj ∈ G such
that x′(byi ) = gj . If v
′
j ≥ vj , then u′i + v′j > ui + vj ; so (byi , gj) blocks (u, v),
which is a contradiction.
(2) We cannot have u′i < ui in case b
y
i ∈ B1. Indeed, if x′(byi ) = gj and
v′j ≥ vj , then the new entrant (the older bride) propose a dowry such that
dboi > db
y
i
, which is contradiction because in periods ε ≤ t < δ, these are the
younger brides that propose the higher dowries. Hence u′i = ui for all b
y
i ∈ B1
and the proof is complete.
By following Anderson, we know that with a population increase, through
time, the average dowries are falling. When a marriage squeeze exists, some
brides decide to re-enter the marriage market when older because they anticipate
lower prices in future. Then, through time, in periods ε ≤ t < δ in which a
marriage squeeze exists, the entrance of a younger bride to the market produces
a result, which has no parallel in the classical matching market.
Remark 1 In the Indian matching market, with a population increase, for pe-
riods ε ≤ t < δ, in which a marriage squeeze exists: let (u, v) be a G − optimal
stable payoff under some M. If by∗i enters the market, then there exists some
G−optimal stable payoff (u′, v′) for some new market M ′ such that: (i) u′i ≤ ui
for every bi ∈ B; (ii) v′j ≤ vj for every gj ∈ G.
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Proof. See the proof of Theorem for the proof of (i). Here, we only demonstrate
the condition (ii).
For the periods ε ≤ t < δ, let byi ∈ B. We are going to show that v′j ≤ vj .
We know that some brides decide to re-enter the marriage market when older
because they anticipate lower dowries in future. So, we cannot have v′j > vj in
case byi enters the market. Indeed, if x
′(byi ) = gj and v
′
j > vj , then the bride
entrant propose a dowry such that: d′
byi
> dbyi , which is contradiction because
through time, in periods ε ≤ t < δ, d′
byi
< dbyi , if some brides decide to re-enter
the marriage market when older.
5 Concluding remarks and discussion
We have studied the Indian marriage market in the cases of a constant popula-
tion and a population increase. In the first case, we have presented the Indian
matching mechanism that finds a stable outcome, an equilibrium stable outcome
and a minimum equilibrium dowry vector. We have also demonstrated that the
set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes are the
same.
In the second case, we have demonstrated that the Indian matching mech-
anism still produces a B − optimal stable outcome when a marriage squeeze
exists.
We have shown that when there is a marriage squeeze in the Indian marriage
market, it is always in every bride’s best interest to behave honestly. The
brides have no interest in misrepresenting their reservation dowries under the
B− optimal stable outcome because they will not able to improve their results.
Our study of questions of comparative statics have revealed interesting re-
sults. Indeed, we have demonstrate that when there is a marriage squeeze in the
Indian marriage market, if a new younger bride enters the market, the results
found are parallel to results obtained in the assignment model. By against,
when we generalize these results for all periods in which the marriage squeeze
exists, the results obtained are no parallel in the literature. It is the same case
when it is an older bride that re-enter the market.
To study the Indian marriage market in the case of a population increase
with a marriage squeeze, we have followed Anderson. However, if we follow
Rao, the results obtained about the study of Strategic questions and questions
of comparative statics will be similar to the results obtained in the classical
matching markets. Indeed, Rao demonstrates that a marriage squeeze causes
the inflation of dowry. Then, all brides (there is no difference between a younger
and an older bride) increase the value of their dowry to be matched. In this
case, no bride improves the result by misrepresenting her reservation dowry. So,
as in the classical matching market, it is always in every bride’s best interest
to behave honestly. For the questions of comparative statics, the entrance of a
new bride in the market creates a competition among all brides. So, as in the
classical matching market, the entry of brides to the market affects all brides
(v′j ≤ vj) and advantage all grooms (u′i ≤ ui).
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